Transforming failing smallholder irrigation schemes in Africa: a theory of change by Pittock, J et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://iahr.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cijw20
International Journal of Water Resources Development
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://iahr.tandfonline.com/loi/cijw20
Transforming failing smallholder irrigation
schemes in Africa: a theory of change
Jamie Pittock , Henning Bjornlund & André van Rooyen
To cite this article: Jamie Pittock , Henning Bjornlund & André van Rooyen (2020) Transforming
failing smallholder irrigation schemes in Africa: a theory of change, International Journal of Water
Resources Development, 36:sup1, S1-S19, DOI: 10.1080/07900627.2020.1819776
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2020.1819776
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 06 Oct 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 630
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 2 View citing articles 
Transforming failing smallholder irrigation schemes in Africa: 
a theory of change
Jamie Pittock a, Henning Bjornlund b and André van Rooyen c
aFenner School of Environment and Society, The Australian National University, Acton, ACT; bSchool of 
Commerce, University of South Australia, Adelaide; cInternational Crops Research Institute for the Semi-arid, 
Tropics, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
ABSTRACT
Drawing on the results of the Transforming Irrigation in Southern 
Africa project, we assess positive transitions in smallholder irriga-
tion schemes. The project’s theory of change is evaluated. Soil 
monitoring tools and agricultural innovation platforms were intro-
duced in five irrigation schemes in Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe. The synergies between these interventions increased 
both crop yields and profitability. This empowered farmers, 
improved equity, and accelerated social learning and innovation. 
The resulting, iterative cycles of change improved governance, 
sustainability and socio-economic outcomes. The challenges of 
scaling these interventions up and out are outlined.
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Introduction
Smallholder irrigation schemes in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have performed badly and 
failed to lift farmers out of poverty, enhance food security or improve local or national 
economies. At the same time, limited land and water resources have been used ineffi-
ciently and contributed to environmental degradation and detracted from other oppor-
tunities for sustainable development.
Farmers across SSA have used agricultural production systems adapted to local bio-
physical and socio-economic conditions, and using agricultural water management, for 
several millennia (Bjornlund et al., 2020a, 2020b). These systems were disrupted during 
the precolonial activities of European traders and intensified under colonialism. This 
disrupted complex production systems – with multiple income and subsistence activities, 
managed by local communities – into centralized top-down production systems focused 
on a few export crops, which disconnected the local communities from the decision- 
making processes. The colonial governments controlled production and marketing, expa-
triating most of the benefits and leaving little for local development, neglecting the 
production of traditional crops, and resulting in poor nutrition. The impact of these 
disruptions has never been adequately addressed by later independent governments, 
largely due to forces outside their control. Hence, despite some early post-independence 
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developments, agricultural production in SSA has continued to perform poorly compared 
to other developing regions (Bjornlund et al., 2020a, 2020b).
Africa is now facing the daunting challenge of feeding 1.5 billion people by 2030 and 
2 billion by 2050 (NEPAD, 2003). Currently, an estimated 530 million people live in rural 
areas and depend primarily on rainfed agriculture with low yields. Yet irrigated agriculture 
in SSA is underdeveloped and has underperformed compared to other regions of the 
world.
FAO (2017) statistics suggest that around 6.3 million hectares in SSA were ‘equipped’ 
for agriculture in 2017, out of an estimated suitable area of 40 million hectares (You et al., 
2011). Due to lack of data and for political reasons, these statistics are likely to greatly 
underestimate a range of farmer-led irrigation, using water diverted from mountain 
streams, shallow groundwater in valley bottoms, pumped irrigation from local water 
bodies, and peri-urban agriculture using waste water (Bjornlund et al., 2020b; Veldwisch 
et al., 2019; Woodhouse et al., 2017).
Governments and donors across Africa are investing in massive expansion of irrigated 
agriculture, assuming this will reduce poverty for smallholder farmers and increase food 
security (Sullivan & Pittock, 2014). However, irrigation in SSA has experienced many 
challenges, with i) irrigation failing to provide adequate return on investment; weak 
market integration and weak water governance institutions; and significant degradation 
and abandonment of irrigated land (Bjornlund et al., 2017; Stirzaker & Pittock, 2014). While 
there are real opportunities to expand the area under irrigation, we need to increase the 
physical and economic land and water productivity of existing schemes. Having learnt the 
lessons from the failures of the past, we can apply better practices in the design of new 
schemes and the refurbishment of old ones.
Irrigated agriculture may overcome many limitations to food security in Africa by 
enabling more reliable crop production under climate variability and change. To achieve 
this, the Transforming Irrigation in Southern Africa (TISA) project has two propositions. 
First, irrigation must be commercially focussed to generate sufficient profits to sustainably 
maintain the extensive water infrastructure and stop the cycle of decay, refurbishment, 
and decay (Stirzaker & Pittock, 2014). Second, enhanced market access for smallholder 
farmers is needed to create independence from governments and provide the incentives 
and confidence for farmers to innovate and expand the benefits from agriculture (van 
Rooyen et al., 2017).
This special issue presents research findings from the project Increasing Irrigation 
Water Productivity in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe through On-Farm 
Monitoring, Adaptive Management and Agricultural Innovation Platforms, later renamed 
Transforming Irrigation in Southern Africa. The project was based on the premise that the 
transition from subsistence- to business-focussed farming is essential to maintain infra-
structure for sustainable irrigation (Shah et al., 2002). To achieve this, it is critical to 
consider irrigation schemes as complex systems, where simple linear interventions will 
not result in sustained development, and working exclusively with farmers is insufficient. 
It is critical to identify the most effective leverage points in these systems to start the 
process of change at the scheme level and interact with higher political levels to support 
systemic change (van Rooyen et al., 2020).
In particular, this article evaluates the effectiveness of TISA’s theory of change (ToC; 
Figure 1) in explaining research outcomes from the interventions made in five irrigation 
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schemes in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe in 2013–17. This evaluation draws on 
articles in this special issue and other project publications. A ToC has been defined as a logical 
sequence of changes that are anticipated to lead to a particular outcome, forming a pathway 
towards impact (Vogel, 2012). In a scoping process among research partners in 2012–13, the 
ToC for TISA was developed (Figure 1). Irrigation schemes are influenced by multiple stake-
holders interacting across various scales. A successful ToC must articulate the roles and 
influence of important stakeholders like farmers, market agents and governments, as well 
as scales such as the farm plot, irrigation scheme and government jurisdiction, based on 
collaborative and iterative processes (Aragón et al., 2010; Vogel, 2012). The ToC emphasized 
that social learning by stakeholders working together would be crucial for influencing the 
system (Aragón et al., 2010).
Starting with water management as a key feature of irrigation schemes as systems, the 
ToC considered higher physical and economic water productivity as the entry point. 
However, physical water productivity was not initially seen by farmers as a major concern, 
and as shall be elaborated, other drivers of change in farmer behaviours were identified. 
The project utilized two separate interventions to investigate what leverage points could 
change farmer behaviours to transform schemes with continuous improvement for profit-
ability and sustainability:
● soil monitoring tools for farmer learning around soil moisture and nutrient dynamics 
for more efficient decision-making with respect to water and fertilizer application; 
and
● agricultural innovation platforms (AIPs) to bring together irrigators and stakeholders 
to generate a vision for the scheme and identify barriers to higher profitability, 
actions to overcome them and who to best implement them.
Figure 1. The 2013 theory of change for transforming smallholder irrigation schemes by setting them 
on a path of continuous improvement in profitability and sustainability (from Stirzaker & Pittock, 
2014).
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Water productivity is a term that can be defined in several ways. Simplistically, 
agricultural ‘water productivity is the ratio of the net benefits from crop [and other] 
systems to the amount of water used to produce those benefits’ (Molden et al., 2010, 
p. 528). There are subsidiary definitions. Physical water productivity is the ratio of 
agricultural produce to the volume of water used. Economic water productivity is the 
value derived per unit of water consumed, and this value can be considered in 
monetary or other terms (Molden et al., 2010). In monetary terms, economic water 
productivity is synonymous with profitability. In our research we have applied both 
subsidiary definitions. Farmers have provided data on changes in physical productivity 
in the form of crop yield where, as a result of using soil monitoring tools, they have 
applied less water (such that this data are for both physical land and water productivity). 
To test our thesis that the irrigation schemes will only be sustainable if they are 
profitable, we have also considered economic productivity, drawing on farmers’ data 
on their gross margins and incomes. Changes in profitability were particularly influ-
enced by decisions to grow different crops and better engage the agricultural value 
chains as a result of AIP processes.
Further, in the water productivity equation, the denominator is expressed as either 
water supply or depletion (Molden et al., 2010). In this research we have used indirect 
supply measures, namely the number and duration of irrigation events, to judge field- 
level water consumption. This is because our interventions are intended to have max-
imum simplicity to empower farmers to apply, learn and innovate rather than seeking to 
measure every litre. In this context, we have sought to change water productivity at the 
farmer and irrigation scheme scale rather than engage the contested debates on basin- 
scale irrigation efficiency and return flows (Grafton et al., 2018).
Methods
The research takes TISA’s 2013 ToC for transforming smallholder irrigation schemes 
(Figure 1; Stirzaker & Pittock, 2014) and begins by defining each of seven elements of 
change it contains. Each of these elements is then assessed to see whether by 2017 
there was evidence of the hypothesized changes. The evidence is drawn from 
a number of sources. The deployment of soil monitoring tools with farmers from 
2014 changed irrigation management practices at five schemes. AIP processes 
enabled farmers to engage regulators and other stakeholders in the agricultural 
value chain to innovate further. Foundational data is from household surveys con-
ducted by TISA at the start of the research (2014) and four years later (2017) to assess 
changes in farming practices and the well-being of farm households at five irrigation 
schemes following TISA project interventions (Bjornlund et al., 2018; Chilundo et al., 
2020; Mdemu et al., 2020; Moyo et al., 2020). More detailed, quantitative assessments 
of aspects such as changes in inequality (Manero et al., 2020), as well as qualitative 
assessments of AIP processes and changes in institutions, are also used to assess the 
extent of the changes (van Rooyen et al., 2020). Published research from this project, 
in this issue and elsewhere, is cited and provides more detailed descriptions of the 
methods. After assessing the elements of the ToC and the long-term outcomes, we 
consider whether these interventions can readily be scaled up and out to achieve 
beneficial changes.
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Seven elements of the ToC
This assessment begins by defining the elements of change in the ToC.
Scale for facilitating change
We hypothesize that change is best facilitated at a scale where a common pool resource is 
managed by a community of interest, and there is the potential for or existence of institu-
tions for cooperative management (Ostrom et al., 1999). In the case of irrigation schemes, the 
common resources include water supply and irrigation infrastructure. Each of the three 
countries had laws that gave local farmer organizations responsibilities and opportunities to 
manage these resources. The organizations have different names in different countries and 
in the academic literature, including ‘irrigation associations’, ‘irrigation management organi-
zations’ and ‘water user associations’. This project engaged with farmer organizations and 
relevant government agencies at six irrigation schemes in the three countries (Table 1).
Entry point for change facilitation
We proposed that water productivity was an entry point for change facilitation (Figure 1; 
Stirzaker & Pittock, 2014). Farmers were provided simple-to-use tools to measure soil 
moisture, fertility and salinity. Importantly, these tools were in the hands of the farmers, 
who had the opportunity to learn themselves how to best use their land and water to 
maximize crop production. This contrasts with the top-down agricultural extension model 
of information provision practiced in these countries. The tools were intended to provide 
data that could be used to generate agronomic benefits; farmer confidence in their own 
knowledge and skills; and community willingness to engage in more complex and longer- 
term change processes (Stirzaker et al., 2017).
AIPs and market incentives
We argued that the main reason that irrigation schemes were failing was the objective of 
food security through self-sufficiency, exacerbated by poorly developed markets, so that 
farming was barely profitable, if at all (Pittock et al., 2017; Stirzaker & Pittock, 2014). 
Consequently, farmers were paying high prices for inputs while receiving low prices for 
their produce. AIPs were proposed as a way for each farming community to identify their 
challenges and opportunities and develop a shared vision for their future. An AIP is 
a forum established to foster interaction among a group of relevant stakeholders around 
a shared interest. The stakeholders perform different but complementary roles in the 
development, dissemination and adoption of knowledge for socio-economic benefit. AIP 
processes seek to harness innovations related to technology and institutions. To promote 
these innovations, partnerships along and beyond agricultural value chains must be 
fostered to bring on board actors with a special mix of skills (Makini et al., 2013; van 
Rooyen et al., 2017). Typically these actors would include agricultural input suppliers or 
service providers, transport and storage service providers, and major produce buyers and 
processors. They may also include government and non-government experts in agron-
omy, business planning and regulation.
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Immediate outcomes
We hypothesized that once farmers experience immediate, positive outcomes it would 
raise confidence and interest, triggering a virtuous cycle of improvement. We expected 
the immediate outcomes to include more efficient water use, greater productivity, and 
strengthening of local organizations. Two self-reinforcing feedback loops were expected 
to be triggered as a result (Figure 1).
Local-scale learning
We postulated that the positive gains from initial interventions would give individual 
farmers and their organizations the confidence and skills to innovate further, resulting in 
higher agricultural productivity and more functional institutions and leading to more and 
more gains. If this occurs, identification and adoption of iterative innovations, and 
progressive increases in measures such as agricultural incomes, should take place 
(Stirzaker et al., 2017; van Rooyen et al., 2017).
Large-scale policy change
We proposed that the positive gains from initial interventions would give farmers the 
confidence and skills to demand more appropriate support services from government 
agencies, which in turn would change practices and provide better support for agricul-
tural activities.


















Associação de 25 
Setembro, District 
of Boane, Maputo 
Province





of Magude, Maputo 
Province#
16 River, pumped Vegetables, maize 0.59 27 0
Tanzania
Kiwere, Iringa District, 
Iringa Region




Magozi, Iringa District, 
Iringa Region




Mkoba, Vungu District 10 Dam, gravity canal Maize, vegetables 0.11 75 35
Silalatshani, Insiza 
District




#Irrigation infrastructure at Khanimambo was rendered inoperable by a flood, so research was not completed here. 
* Magozi produces rice using flood irrigation, so soil moisture monitoring tools could not be used. 
^ Research focussed in Landela, one of five blocks at the Silalatshani irrigation scheme.
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Long-term outcomes
From this virtuous cycle of change, we expected three key, long-term outcomes: more 
sustainable water use, greater food security and higher farm incomes.
Assessing the seven elements
Scale for facilitation of change
We proposed that change is best facilitated at a scale where there is a community of 
interest in a common pool resource: namely, the water supply for irrigation using scheme 
infrastructure. We found that the scale of impact differed between the soil monitoring 
tools and AIPs.
Soil monitoring tools
The number of soil monitoring tools distributed to farmers in a given scheme was 
determined by the availability of the tools in relation to the number of farmers. The 
various schemes received different proportions of soil monitoring tools (Table 1). The 
most important finding was that the learning by farmers with tools was high, leading to 
behavioural change, which soon spread to many farmers who did not have the tools, 
through farmer-to-farmer learning (Table 2; Parry et al., 2020). While the relationship 
between the number of soil monitoring tools in a scheme and the resulting changes 
varied from scheme to scheme (Table 2), we can say that as little as 24% tool ownership 
(Table 1), in combination with farmer-to-farmer learning, resulted in rapid change (in less 
than three years) in irrigation behaviour by at least two-thirds of the farmers in each 
scheme (Table 2). It is important to consider the incentives behind the reduction of 
irrigation frequency. That not irrigating one’s plot saves significant time, and understand-
ing that less irrigation reduces leaching of nutrients, are important drivers of changing 
irrigation intensity. Higher yields reinforce this learning and strengthen these feedback 
mechanisms. The outcome is higher physical water productivity, but since most farmers 
on gravity-fed canal systems are not paying for water by volume, saving water is not the 
primary driver of change.
It was critical that these behavioural changes empowered the farmers to change the 
institutions determining the timing of irrigation (van Rooyen et al., 2020). If farmers 
cannot influence the relevant authority to offer flexible water supply, then individual 
farmers reducing their water application may not result in larger-scale water savings. 
While this project significantly reduced water use, these results stimulate new research 
questions. Is there a ratio of minimum number of soil monitoring tool owners to non- 
owners that would enable more effective use of the tools? To what extent and at what 
speed will farmer-to-farmer learning from tool use continue to cause more and more 
farmers to change their behaviour? And what proportion of farmers will not change?
Agricultural innovation platforms
The scale at which AIPs focus their work is vital for success (van Rooyen et al., 2020). 
Focussing at a small scale (i.e. at the plot level of a few farmers) will not capture the larger 
system dynamics and the importance of stimulating production at the aggregate level; 
and small-scale change will not attract the interest of input and output markets. On the 
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other hand, working at too large a scale may focus attention on larger market and support 
structures but lose the engagement of farmers. The appropriate scale is one which can 
capture the multitude of plot-level dynamics, while also attracting stakeholders from 
input and output markets, support services and local institutions that make the system 
function while generating sufficient pressure to convince a higher level of governance to 
make systemic changes.
Moreover, to ensure strong leverage, it is important to aim at a scale large enough to 
increase the footprint on the ground (i.e. maximize the number of farmers) while simul-
taneously working with the smallest number of actors at the higher levels of organization.
To evaluate or determine the best scale of the AIP, it is important to consider the 
functions of the AIP processes: removing barriers to production and improving access to 
markets to increase profitability, and facilitating communication and trust between 
stakeholders. Thus, the AIP should operate at a level where its actors represent 
a community of interest so it can form meaningful collaborations.
To reach the most farmers on the ground, TISA focused at the scheme level (or the 
block level in a very large scheme like Silalatshani), as this may be the smallest scale to 
engage without losing stakeholders at higher levels. The scheme is the operational unit 
for many actors and processes, including input suppliers (water, seeds, fertilizer, finance, 
information and farmer organizations) and output buyers and processors, decision- 
making and governance, scheme payments, and tenure management. How far can one 
go up the scale without losing touch with the base, and without including too many 
actors who may be irrelevant to one another? The scheme level proved to be appropriate, 
as our interventions did indeed cause systemic changes at higher levels of governance 
(Chilundo et al., 2020; Mdemu et al., 2020; Moyo et al., 2020; van Rooyen et al., 2020). In 
the very large scheme at Silalatshani, project interventions at one of five blocks were 
sufficient for government agencies to change water scheduling and cropping policies for 
the whole scheme.
Much of the higher-level governance systems operate at the district scale, influencing 
several schemes. Similarly, input and output markets may operate at this level, but the 
diversity of commodities produced may require the inclusion of a different range of value 
chain players.
This raises the question: What are the minimum conditions that allow niche-level 
innovations to break into the space of the regime (Geels, 2002)? In Zimbabwe, this was 
assisted by the government staff at higher levels becoming interested in the changes. 
Similarly, in Mozambique, the engagement of the Director of Irrigation facilitated the 
change process. In Tanzania, there was significant change at the district government 
scale, but frequent leadership changes in the National Irrigation Commission and a focus 
by funders on new irrigation schemes, in line with their approved sector support strate-
gies, limited changes by national institutions.
Entry point
When intervening in complex systems such as irrigation schemes it is critical to carefully 
consider which entry point to use. It is particularly critical to consider the entry points that 
drive feedback mechanisms and institutional design, which leverage change in a range of 
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other potential entry points to bring about systemic change. Van Rooyen et al. (2020) 
provide a discussion of this in the context of the TISA project.
As the project commenced, we found the need to slightly adapt the ToC. First, in the 
initial AIP meetings, it became apparent that in half of the schemes there were ‘deal 
breaker’ issues that needed to be resolved before farmers would effectively engage in the 
project. These issues are threshold levels from a regime systems perspective and were 
addressed first. Second, significant synergies between ToC elements 2 and 3 emerged. 
Simply using the term ‘productivity’ in element 2 fails to acknowledge that productivity 
can be measured in terms of yield (physical water productivity) or in monetary terms 
(economic water productivity) (Molden et al., 2010). Increased productivity was therefore 
split between elements 2 and 3, with physical productivity being the focus of element 2, 
while element 3 focused on converting higher physical productivity into higher economic 
productivity.
The deal breaker in Silalatshani was an unpaid water bill to the Zimbabwe National 
Water Authority (ZINWA), which was beyond the farmers’ ability to pay and caused by the 
transfer of the debt from devaluated Zimbabwean dollars to US dollars. To force farmers 
to pay the bill, ZINWA stopped water delivery at critical stages of the growth season, and 
farmers saw their investment in inputs being lost; hence, those who could abandon the 
scheme in pursuit of other livelihood options did so. To address this, a ZINWA represen-
tative from Harare was invited to the first AIP meeting. It became clear to them that the 
scheme would never resume operations unless a solution was found. ZINWA then 
negotiated a payment structure with the farmers that enabled the project to proceed 
(Moyo et al., 2020, 2017).
In 25 Setembro in Mozambique and Magozi in Tanzania, the deal breaker was the 
condition of the supply infrastructure. In Mozambique, the poor quality of supply canals 
resulted in slow supply and high transmission losses. The water supply to tail-end users 
was uncertain and costly, as farmers had to buy diesel to run the pump until the water 
reached their plot. On the strength of the discussion at the first AIP meeting, the 
Mozambican government decided to fund the lining of the main canal, and farmers 
actively started to engage in the project (Chilundo et al., 2020; De Sousa et al., 2017). At 
the Magozi scheme in Tanzania, the AIP discussions facilitated enlargement of the intake 
and the water right (Mdemu et al., 2020, 2017). In these cases, engagement via the AIPs of 
scheme farmers identified elements of the socio-ecological systems that were at sub-
critical levels and enabled interventions to move to a more desirable state.
The two interventions, the soil monitoring tools and the AIPs, addressed different 
aspects of increasing yield and system efficiency. The tools facilitated farmer learning 
about soil moisture and nutrient dynamics (Parry et al., 2020; Stirzaker et al., 2017), which 
resulted in their (roughly) halving water application, better managing fertilizers and 
significantly increasing yield. Activities initiated by the AIP increased yield in two ways. 
First, it supported and accelerated the learning process, both for farmers with and without 
the soil monitoring tools, through test plots of higher yielding varieties, soil analysis for 
better fertilizer application, and focus groups to discuss the learning from the soil 
monitoring tools (Parry et al., 2020). Second, it connected farmers to providers of better- 
quality fertilizers, seeds and pesticides.
The combined impact of the two interventions significantly increased yield and had 
several additional benefits. It reduced the time farmers spent irrigating, leaving more time 
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for other farm activities such as weeding, which reduced the competition for water and 
nutrients, further increasing yield. Many also invested the time in off-farm income 
activities that increased household income and the ability to buy high-quality inputs, 
further increasing yield. It also significantly reduced water use, increasing the supply for 
tail-end and downstream users. This substantially reduced conflicts over water use within 
the schemes, and in Tanzania also with downstream users. For further details, see Table 2 
and Chilundo et al. (2020), Moyo et al. (2020), and Mdemu et al. (2020).
AIPs and market incentives
The AIP processes enhanced synergies between the technical and the soft interventions in 
TISA (van Rooyen et al., 2020). The common vision developed by each AIP provided 
everybody with a clear path for themselves. In multistakeholder processes, a commonly 
understood and accepted vision provides the framework for each stakeholder to deter-
mine their role and contribution to the success of the overall process. Those who may 
have acted to obstruct progress are often able to see how they can turn from villain to 
hero. Similarly, transparent processes allow all stakeholders to see who is holding the 
system back and stimulate otherwise unwilling actors into positive responses. Farmers 
found the visioning a powerful process and expressed the value of being able to dream 
and plan. Poorer farmers seldom have the luxury of reflecting on their current situation 
and future aspirations. Drawing this out on paper and accompanying it with a narrative of 
how to achieve these future states allow farmers time, often for the first time, to reflect 
and plan a possible future (van Rooyen et al., 2017).
While most problem analysis deciphers the technical interventions, the visioning 
exercise focuses on the processes required to reach the desired state. It is in this context 
that the AIPs identify opportunities for training, stimulate further learning, evaluate 
changes, adapt interventions and readjust future activities based on results. Some of 
the actions emerging from the AIP meetings could have been initiated by other institu-
tions. For example, an agricultural extension agency could undertake gross margin 
analyses with farmers. However, the AIP process was powerful in increasing the legitimacy 
of decisions because it was undertaken by the farmers, and backed by key stakeholders, as 
part of a deliberate approach to achieve their vision for their community.
Soil monitoring tools were not used in the Magozi rice-growing scheme in Tanzania, 
which provides a case study where an AIP was the sole intervention. Magozi illustrates 
how major, systemic change can arise from an AIP visioning process, which was encapsu-
lated in a community business plan. The key changes included successfully securing 
permission to divert more water to enable irrigation of a large part of the command 
area that could not be reliably supplied; agreeing to grow fewer, more profitable varieties 
to secure a high volume for sale and attract higher prices; improving agronomic practices; 
establishing a machinery hire cooperative; and building a rice mill for processing and 
a storehouse to enable sales at more profitable times (Mdemu et al., 2020). All these 
changes facilitated higher economic productivity. Water diversions increased from the 
Little Ruaha River, and we did not quantify water productivity. However, farmers report 
that their average rice yield increased by 29%, and gross margins increased by 22%, and 
86% of farmers cropped previously untilled land within the irrigation command area 
(Mdemu et al., 2020). Nevertheless, Mdemu et al. (2020, p. 20) found that ‘while positive 
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outcomes were still attained in Magozi, where only an AIP was implemented, there is 
some evidence from Kiwere that suggests outcomes are greater when both interventions 
are introduced together’.
The AIP’s strongest influence in bringing about transformational change is its capacity to 
link relevant, but often distant, actors with one another such that they realize each other’s 
relevance in their own business (van Rooyen et al., 2020). Over time, these linkages will 
strengthen to a point where external facilitation is no longer required to maintain the 
constellation of actors, and the AIP becomes redundant (see Figure 11 in Bjornlund et al., 
2018).
Immediate outcomes
Positive outcomes from the soil monitoring tools plus AIP interventions were identified in 
all schemes (Chilundo et al., 2020, for Mozambique; Mdemu et al., 2020, for Tanzania; 
Moyo et al., 2020, for Zimbabwe) and are summarized in Table 2. Some of these changes 
were expected, but others were not.
Between 70% and 93% of farmers in each of the schemes that deployed soil monitor-
ing tools knew what they measured, even though only 24–47% had soil monitoring 
installed in their fields. Subsequently, 41–86% of farmers reported changing their irriga-
tion practices, and 32–74% changed fertilization practices. Notably, 40–85% of farmers 
reduced their frequency of irrigation, and 4–56% reduced the duration of irrigation 
events. Further, 61–93% spent more on farm inputs. Crop yields increased a lot – from 
a 28% increase in green maize at Kiwere to 313% in 25 Setembro (Table 2).
With greater profits from cropping, household income increased for 43–94% of farm-
ers, and because of less time spent irrigating, 43–60% increased their off-farm income too 
(Table 2). A notable outcome was the improved livelihoods of the poorest farmers. Over 
the period of study, the incomes of the poorest sections of the farming population 
increased. At low levels of local economic growth the relative income inequality 
increased, but then it dropped as growth increased (Manero et al., 2020).
The changes observed are not linear, which is characteristic of complex systems. The 
initial entry points have created positive feedback, leading to continual improvement 
(Bjornlund et al., 2018; van Rooyen et al., 2020). There are several examples of immediate 
outcomes. Reducing the water applied to fields gave farmers at the tail end of canals 
enough water to grow crops, reducing conflict among farmers within the irrigation 
schemes by 64–83%. Together with a 64–100% increase in farmers’ willingness to pay 
fees, this resulted in a 82–100% increase in farmers’ willingness to engage in collective 
action such as infrastructure repair and bulk purchase of inputs, further improving irrigation 
profitability. Importantly, these changes are lifting farmers out of poverty, with most farm-
ers reporting spending more on education, food, health, and farm development (Table 2).
Local-scale learning by farmers and their organizations
Training was only conducted if those being trained had an immediate opportunity to apply 
their new skills in their own context and would benefit from doing so, as this made behaviour 
change more likely. Feedback loops proved critical in sustaining change and link with 
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complex adaptive systems (leverage points 7 and 8 for change as detailed in van Rooyen et al., 
2020).
The soil monitoring tools were designed to produce data to facilitate farmer learning 
about the dynamics between water application and the fertility of their soil (leverage 
point 6, structured information flow in van Rooyen et al., 2020), and initiate a process of 
farmer-to-farmer learning to spread the impact beyond those having the soil monitoring 
tools in their fields. The AIP processes, through engaging and bringing together critical 
actors and initiating transparent processes, further facilitated farmer and farmer-to-farmer 
learning (Chilundo et al., 2020; Mdemu et al., 2020; Moyo et al., 2020; Parry et al., 2020). 
This included discussion of soil monitoring data in focus groups; gross-margin analysis to 
inform selection of more profitable crops; test plots where farmers experimented with 
different seeds, fertilizer application and irrigation techniques; and visits to other schemes 
to learn how to enhance governance (leverage point 4, system self-organization).
Collaborative mapping of the schemes (in Tanzania and Mozambique) illustrates the 
benefits of farmer learning triggering continuous improvement (Pittock et al., 2018). 
Through this transparent process, farmers learnt the exact area of each plot and the 
extent of scheme infrastructure and so understood the differences in their water fees and 
their maintenance responsibilities. This reduced conflict over payment of fees and 
increased participation in maintenance work (Table 2).
TISA interventions have improved equity, empowering more people to learn and 
contribute to their farming communities (Manero et al., 2020; Parry et al., 2020). There 
are signs of equity improvements with respect to women and youth involvement in 
farming. Women have been the most rapid adopters of high-value crops, and there has 
been a substantial shift from male-dominated to joint household decision making and 
more female decision making (Bjornlund et al., 2019). There is evidence of young people 
returning to profitable schemes. In Mozambique, unused irrigation plots were reallocated 
to young farmers (Chilundo et al., 2020).
Parry et al. (2020) analyze the learnings across all schemes and place them within 
a theoretical framework. What is evident is that given the opportunity to learn, gain 
experience in prioritizing and addressing their own issues, and adopt a more commercial 
farming mindset, farmers will continue to innovate. This became a virtuous feedback loop 
where innovation brought benefits that enabled further positive change, which occurred 
independent of governments. The implementation of the business plan developed by the 
Magozi farmers illustrates this confidence and independence.
Large-scale policy change by government
Particularly in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, governments have undertaken numerous 
policy changes that were informed by TISA, which are reported in this special issue and by 
Mwamakamba et al. (2017). For instance, project interventions at Silalatshani enabled 
production of a more diverse range of higher-value crops in place of mandated staple 
commodities. Based on this economic success, the Ministry of Agriculture no longer 
requires adherence to a cropping calendar, so farmers are free to innovate and produce 
more profitable crops (van Rooyen et al., 2020).
Perhaps more importantly, the project interventions have led to sub-national policy 
changes at the local to provincial scales (often by district governments), as illustrated at 
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Silalatshani by the agreement on how to resolve the water debt owed to ZINWA 
(described above and by Moyo et al., 2017). Our further hypothesis is that these local-to- 
provincial-scale governance innovations generate examples that may catalyze further 
national reforms in the future.
Long-term outcomes
There are reasons to believe that the interventions are sustainable in the long term. 
However, questions remain as to whether they can be scaled out (‘horizontally’) to other 
schemes and scaled up in terms of levels of governance and value chains to permanently 
change the broader irrigated agricultural systems.
Social learning has improved the confidence and changed the mindset of most farmers 
from subsistence towards commercial farming. Their practices have changed to negotiate 
favourable agreements in the value chain; use agricultural resources more efficiently; and 
select more valuable crops and higher-yielding varieties. The farmers have learned how to 
identify and prioritize problems and implement solutions. Higher profitability will drive 
further adoption and innovation, regardless of government involvement.
Autonomous out-scaling of innovations at the district scale is already evident. For 
example, starting from the Landela block of the Silalatshani scheme (where the soil 
monitoring tools were initially installed), agronomic practices were improved, and farmers 
in adjacent blocks and schemes started to grow more profitable crops. This out-scaling 
was driven by farmer-to-farmer learning, entrepreneurial agricultural extension staff, and 
the input supply and output buyers attracted to the Landela block.
The outcomes with respect to changes in government policy have been mixed. We 
hypothesized that government staff might have viewed the empowerment of farmers 
through project interventions as undermining their roles and status. To the contrary, 
farmer demand for technical information from agricultural extension staff increased 
with innovation (Table 2), and officers have expressed greater job satisfaction. The 
Zimbabwean government is collaborating in a new pilot to extend the project’s 
interventions into nearly 30 public irrigation schemes in Matabeland North Province, 
mainstreaming new practices into the operations of the relevant agencies. If success-
ful, further scale-up is proposed. The government has also informally adjusted several 
policies as a result of TISA, reducing water fees and allowing more flexible water 
supply and crop choices. Informed by the situation at 25 Setembro, the Mozambican 
government adopted new regulations for irrigation associations (Mwamakamba et al., 
2017). The new regulations include measures to assign ownership and management 
to each piece of infrastructure; plan and budget for operations and maintenance of 
scheme infrastructure; and allow reassignment of unused irrigation plots to new 
farmers (Chilundo et al., 2020; van Rooyen et al., 2020). They are exploring adoption 
of project interventions into their major irrigation expansion programme. Despite 
strong district-government engagement, management instability in a key government 
agency has hindered up-scaling in Tanzania. Government fees and bureaucracy for 
importing the soil monitoring tools has significantly hindered tool deployment.
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Can these interventions be scaled out and up?
This initial international research, soil monitoring tools and AIP project interventions cost 
AUD3.2 million (~USD2.2 million) over four years in irrigation schemes with ~3,000 farmers 
(Table 1). Are these complex adaptive system changes so attractive to value chain participants 
and governments that adoption will spread out and up in a cost-effective and self-sustaining 
manner? Research is funded to test this from 2017 to 2021; the initial results are mixed.
A sustainable business model for commercial production and access to soil monitoring 
tools is the focus of ongoing research and development in the Virtual Irrigation Academy 
project (https://via.farm/). During TISA the soil monitoring tools were provided free to 
farmers. Researchers provided follow-up service to deal with training and repair or 
replacement of damaged equipment. In a self-sustaining commercial system, there will 
be costs in tool manufacture, retailer supply and margins, farmer training and service 
provision. Abebe et al. (2020) found that farmers who experienced access to the soil 
monitoring tools in the pilot phase would be willing to pay only a portion of the 
manufacturing cost of the current prototype. Farmers may be willing to purchase soil 
monitoring tools collectively, depending on the commercial prices, or make a co-payment 
for subsidized access to tools.
Hence, there is a strong argument that the soil monitoring tools and AIP approach 
should be supported by the public sector. National governments and donors are investing 
very large sums in the establishment and rehabilitation of irrigation schemes. The minor 
additional costs of the provision of soil monitoring tools and institutions like AIPs are 
worthwhile to ensure that this investment succeeds. Further, the public interest in seeing 
poverty reduced, food security improved and scarce water resources used efficiently 
warrants subsidizing soil monitoring tools and AIPs. In this case, the additional function-
ality of wi-fi connectivity – which can collect and store soil moisture data semi- 
automatically from the latest model of Chameleon in the Virtual Irrigation Academy 
cloud platform – is likely to be necessary to provide a service to governments and other 
organizations. This would allow these organizations to monitor and improve the perfor-
mance of the irrigation schemes they have funded.
However, the Virtual Irrigation Academy platform requires some manual uploading of 
information, such as crop type, yield, and gross margins. Our experience thus far is that 
farmers and extension staff enthusiastically make on-the-spot decisions with data from 
the soil monitoring tools, and generate the range of benefits discussed in this article. 
However, without incentives they will not reliably upload the data required for more 
systematic and aggregated analysis. Further work is required to identify how to sustain-
ably provide such incentives.
The out- and up-scaling of AIPs raises other questions. It has been argued that AIPs 
require skilled and independent facilitators and should be context-specific (Makini et al., 
2013). The costs of undertaking AIPs at each irrigation scheme would be prohibitive. In 
each of the communities involved in the project we found extension officers and farmers 
who had the required facilitation and leadership skills, and who also had the trust of the 
people to facilitate AIP processes (as well as some who did not). Government extension 
agencies will be critical as proponents of self-sustaining innovation systems, because they 
are mandated to do so and have some resources to undertake this work. However, 
extension staff will need to be aware of how to manage their roles as proponents of 
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government policies, versus facilitators of AIP processes, where unorthodox ideas are 
welcomed. There is also a risk that the skilled extension staff will be promoted and not 
replaced.
TISA is testing whether the number of AIPs required can be minimized by out-scaling 
successful innovations from existing scheme-level AIPs to adjacent, similar irrigation 
schemes; or establishing AIPs at the district scale to involve multiple irrigation schemes 
with similar circumstances. As AIPs are scaled up, we will be assessing at what point it is 
best to engage and enhance an existing governance organization (e.g. a regional devel-
opment committee) versus establishing a new AIP.
Conclusion
The agricultural water management research in SSA presented in this special issue shows 
that application of simple-to-use soil monitoring tools provided critical information for 
farmer learning. The AIP processes reinforced this learning and innovation by connecting 
farmers to input and output markets, which enabled the rules of the irrigation systems to 
be changed. Together, these interventions fostered the development of positive feedback 
loops in the complex irrigation systems. They demonstrate that multiple interventions are 
required to transition failing irrigation systems towards a sustainable and profitable state. 
The failures of irrigation in Africa can be largely ascribed to the central control exerted by 
governments, whose goals and objectives often do not align with the needs of irrigation 
communities.
Learning was a critical contributor to the project’s impacts. Individual farmers learnt by 
holding soil monitoring tools in their hands and making immediate and informed deci-
sions. This led to experimentation and further adaptation, such as reducing application of 
water. At other scales, farmer organizations and local governments learnt, as did exten-
sion officers and government officials, leading to systemic changes.
We conclude that the ToC based on water productivity, measured in terms of both 
yield and profits, as an entry point has largely worked. Specifically, changing the irrigation 
paradigm from subsistence to commercial-oriented production has created a profit- 
driven virtuous cycle of change. This has been reinforced by farmers applying pressure 
on government agencies for policy change, leading to improved sustainability and socio- 
economic outcomes.
We are not arguing that this combination of soil monitoring tools and AIPs is essential 
to improve irrigation scheme performance in every instance. In the case of the Magozi rice 
scheme in Tanzania, significant improvements in crop yield and profitability were 
obtained without the soil monitoring tools. We did not test the use of tools in other 
institutional settings, such as out-grower schemes, but we expect this could result in 
similar socio-economic benefits without AIPs. We do, however, find that there were 
positive synergies where the soil monitoring tools and AIPs were deployed together.
This research found benefits from multiple interventions to strengthen farmers’ pro-
blem-solving skills and market development. In particular, the social and economic value 
arising from the synergies among AIPs, soil monitoring tools and scheme mapping was 
demonstrated.
TISA has developed the capacity of a range of local actors to engage in adaptive 
processes for more productive irrigation schemes through their institutions, replacing 
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central control with more collaborative governance. Future projects for more sustainable 
irrigation need to consider where power lies and who makes the decisions, in order to 
empower those affected to contribute their knowledge and innovations.
New research is needed to assess/test how measures from TISA can be scaled out and 
up in a cost-effective manner with support from government agencies. In the 2017–2021 
phase of the project the ToC has been revised to hypothesize how reform can be 
catalyzed at different scales. In particular, the next level of research and application is 
across the irrigation sector at the district scale (subnational district, province or county). 
There is also a need to understand how to further enable national irrigation agencies to 
apply lessons to enhance policies and practices.
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